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Governments and public sectors are not always regarded as exemplary managers. Yet
in employment relations (ER) they have frequently led the way to reform, not least of
all in the state of New South Wales (NSW), Australia. The twelve years of a Labor
government from 1976 marked a period of unprecedented ER reform, substantially
based on equity. The subsequent government supported some of these ER policies but
initiated an ambitious reform agenda in ways that undermined the earlier ER gains.
In particular, the introduction of the NSW Senior Executive Service (SES) with its
focus on organisational efficiency can be viewed as an enabling and inhibiting force in
ER reform. The present Labor government in continuing the SES has moved to ER
driven by political choice. This article uses literature and document review and
University of Technology (UTS) research undertaken on behalf of the Audit Office of
NSW (1998) to examine the impact of different NSW governments' approaches to ER
reform. First the article explores the Labor government's equity-based ER initiatives.
Second, it considers the changes instituted by the subsequent government, especially
the SES, and the impact on ER. Third, the present government's ER approach within
the context of the SES is reviewed.
Introduction
Most governments come to power with some major agenda for change, not least of all in
the ER arena. Thus, continuing cycles of review and reform are a constant part of public
sector life and in origin, in NSW, reviews can be traced back to the early days of British
colonisation. This suggests that the public sector is prepared to change and, hopefully, will
learn incrementally from each review process. It is, therefore, worth reflecting some time
after significant moments of change in public sector history, in this case ER reform,
whether the policies have been sustainable in the longer-term and intended beneficiaries
actually have benefited (Curnow, 1978;Wettenhall, 1978).
By the 1970s, in the public sector arena, generally, it was evident that the various processes
of ER reform had resulted in an employment environment that was attractive in many
ways. From this perspective, as Wilenski (1986: 158) points out, public servants enjoyed
benefits that were not usually available in other employment sectors. For example, 'in
most countries public employment provider d 1 ... improved security of tenure ... access to
special pension schemes ... internal training and subsidised outside education, upward
mobility and career ladders ... [and] rights of appeal to special tribunals against certain
actions of the employer'.
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In addition to these positive aspects of public employment, however, one of the over-riding
considerations of administrative reform, in terms of ER from the mid 1970s, related to a
concern for greater equity as a stronger driving value than efficiency. While equity could
have both an internal and external focus, obviously, it was the internal focus that was more
critical to ER reform. To this end, the public sector employment environment was to
become more representative of the community at large, beyond the traditional access by a
socially privileged minority. Commitment to more equal employment policies provided
opportunities for previously disadvantaged employees, within the public sector, such as
women and minority groups, to pursue better career choices or even to gain access to
public sector employment from outside, where previously they had been denied. The idea
that merit was a randomly distributed attribute and value across employee communities
also underpinned ER reform (Wilenski, 1986;Alaba, 1994).
While the factors leading up to this seemingly more ideal notion of ER reform, are
complex, undoubtedly, social movements, such as those supporting anti-discrimination
and feminist beliefs, stimulated greater awareness about equity and the benefits of less
discriminatory organisational ER. Affirmative action policies to discriminate positively for
the benefit of certain employee groups, beyond a principle of equality, also supported
employment equity. To this end, as Wilenski (1986: 161) argues, these new employment
policies, which formed around equity as a driving principle of reform, were designed to
shift the focus of activity from administrative process to an interest in positive ER policy
outcomes for the intended beneficiaries. In this sense, within a more democratically
governed public sector environment, access to public employment was to be a 'civil right'
and public sector employee groups were to be more socially representative of society at
large. Furthermore, with this kind of ER reform, it was intended to seek a balance between
objectives of efficiency and equity. However, as ER related policies of three different
governments in NSW show, from 1976to the present, the reform process is not necessarily
about balance but may be related to a strong driving interest in equity or efficiency or
politicisation, depending upon the predisposition of the government of the day.
Equity and the Social Reform 'Model' of ER?
The Wran-Ied Labor government came to power in 1976 after many years in opposition,
clearly concerned about the need for reform, especially in ER. The lessons learnt from the
experience of his federal Labor government predecessor, Prime Minister Whitlam, in the
early 1970s caused Wran to consider how poor relations between government and its
public bureaucracy could hinder the reform process (Wilenski, 1986). According to Alaba
(1994: 62), Wran, like other political leaders before and since, perceived his public
bureaucracy to be a likely 'enemy' of reform. Nevertheless, the Wran government
embarked upon an extensive reform agenda, partly prompted by the general thrust of the
federal government's Coombs review.
However, the Wran government developed its own system of formal review between 1977
and 1982 led by Peter Wilenski, who had political connections to Labor and wide public
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service and academic credentials in the area. Having been involved with the Coombs
review and having seen that, as a heavy bureaucratic process, the recommendations had
received little direct response from the federal government, Wilenski decided to proceed
on the basis of a social reform agenda for the NSW public sector (Wilenski, 1986; Alaba,
1994).
Wilenski's (1986; Alaba, 1994) idea was that the public bureaucracy, as the primary
instrument for social reform on behalf of government, needed to undergo reform itself also
on the basis of social justice. Only then could broader community-directed redistributive
policies and programs of a social democratic government work in the public interest.
While it would be trite to suggest that the reform process was straightforward in any way
the social justice drive remained strong. This was in spite of the fact that the overall reform
process, beyond ER considerations, was affected by a multitude of power-political issues,
not least of all from unions and the Public Service Board (PSB). Strident criticisms and
obvious opposition made the reform process problematic on a number of fronts. That the
Wran government, to a large extent, wrested central control from the independent PSBand
moved direct control towards the Premier's Department did help to facilitate the reform
process, even if key actors remained unplacated.
Nevertheless, the purpose of the Wilenski social reform approach was to address personnel
policies 'in terms of equity, responsiveness and efficiency' (Alaba, 1994:138). The value of
equity within the reform agenda was to be elevated to a position where it was considered
to be equally if not more important than efficiency. The underlying principles of ER
reform were: (1) equal access to public sector employment as an entitlement; (2)
discriminatory practices through loss of potential capability were inefficient; and, (3) the
interests of under-represented employee groups in the public sector may be overlooked in
terms of under-represented groups in the wider community.
In undertaking its own research in the absence of any NSW public sector data, the Wilenski
review found that discriminatory employment practices were high in the NSW public
service. This review identified numerous systemic and attitudinal barriers that supported
discrimination especially in relation to women in the workforce, minority groups, junior
and aged employees, people with homosexual preferences and previous criminality
(Wilenski, 1986;Alaba, 1994).
Women, for example while accounting for around half of the workforce were mostly
involved in menial positions and, thus, were poorly paid, barely represented in senior
positions and had limited opportunities for training. Similarly, Aboriginal employees were
few and were also in menial positions, as were employees from non-English speaking
backgrounds. Strong cultural biases were evident in a range of recruitment and other
personnel policies. The relatively low level of employees with a disability indicated that
they were also discriminated against in terms of entry and career opportunities. While
previous policies, had been in place supposedly to address the diverse discriminatory
imbalances these had not worked over time. Therefore, Wilenski proposed an affirmative
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action ERresponse, through strong anti-discrimination and equal employment opportunity
thrusts reflected in policy, legislative and institutional reform (Wilenski, 1986;Alaba, 1994).
Perceived poor managerial and policy development capabilities, especially in statutory
authorities also led Wilenski to recommend changes in the employee promotional system
in the NSW public sector. This particularly was designed to address the closed, internal
promotional system on the basis of seniority and to institute an open system of
appointment on merit, from within or without the public sector and involving public
advertisements of vacant positions. This proposed radical change, while eventually
supported in legislative and policy reform, was strongly resisted at first by a wide range of
stakeholders, including trade unions. Similarly, permanent part-time work, meant to
favour women, was also opposed by the unions for some time (Wilenski, 1986;Alaba,
1994).
Overall, this rather extraordinary transformative change to ERwas designed to establish
the NSW public sector as an exemplary employer body. Moreover, the strong anti-
discrimination and equal employment reform agenda was to have wider relevance than
just the NSW public sector, as legislative change was more broadly encompassing to
require similar ERresponses from significant private sector employers. The idea that the
reform process for greater social justice in government programs and services to benefit the
community at large could be led by an exemplary public sector was novel, visionary and
inspirational. There also was no doubt that the basic underlying principle for reform was
equity before efficiency. In facilitating this process of change, Wilenski (1986;Alaba, 1994)
provided a significant gift to many in the public sector at that time, especially those who
had perceived that their career prospects were low. This positive ER legacy based on
equity, it was hoped (and expected), might last beyond a change of party leader, as it did,
but a change of government after twelve years in office meant that the ER equity based
reforms were potentially at risk.
The SESOrganisational Efficiency 'Model' of ERReform?
The Greiner Liberal-National Party Coalition government came to office in 1988with a
grim determination to address organisational inefficiencies in the NSW public sector, and
macro economic efficiency more broadly. Driven managerially, within the context of a
market-based neoclassical economic reform approach (Self,1993;Hughes, 1994),Greiner
also chose a review to support his change agenda, a process led by a key private sector
business figure in NSW, in contrast toWilenski's social focus (NSWCommission of Audit
1989). Greiner's own primary objective and of his key reviewer was to restructure the
NSW public sector along the lines of a private sector corporate model of a holding
company (the government) with diversified subsidiary businesses operating below (the
NSW public sector). This was supposedly a more efficient model of public sector
governance than any model that had been applied before.
Thus, it was apparent that the critical focus of ER reform had shifted from a concern for
equity and social and redistributive justice in the public sector and wider community to
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economic rationalism and macro and micro economic reform, through productivity
improvements. The public interest, therefore, was conceptualised on the basis of financial
and economic efficiency rather than direct social benefit. While social reform, obviously,
was not totally abandoned it was considered in terms of the market-based approach with
efficiencyimprovement as an overriding goal. There was, therefore, an obvious shift in the
NSW public sector towards a model of an exemplary efficient resource manager, in a
private business sense, rather than as a social justice reformer (Wearing, 1995). For future
positive ER in the NSW public sector and in comparison to Wran, such an economic
rationalist approach had serious negative ramifications for ER.
For instance, one way of achieving organisational efficiency was to rationalise special
interest services provided through a number of institutional forms. Greiner early on and
contrary to electoral commitment soon indicated his lack of support for special interest
groups within the public sector and the community beyond. In the women's area,
Greiner's government largely dismantled the multiple internal, bureaucratic and external
community structures and processes designed to address women's employment status and
concerns. Instead, Greiner indicated that social policies and programs would be more
efficient by mainstreaming and being directed towards the broader public interest rather
than special interests (Chappell, 1995).
However, as Chappell (1995)argues the dismantling of women's structures in the NSW
public sector probably had more to do with what the government perceived as the
inappropriate use of power by feminists employed in the NSWpublic sector, to influence
electoral politics on behalf of Labor, than it did with the general public interest. The
supposed political actions of so-called radical feminists within the NSWpublic sector was
also decried by this government. Thus, women's issues from an ERperspective were cast
in a totally different light from that ofGreiner's predecessor. This is not to say that there
was no commitment to women's issues in the wider community because there was, but
affirmative action for minority groups in the NSW public sector was not so actively
supported. In fact many initiatives of the previous government, relating to women, were
deliberately overturned across a number of portfolio areas.
The somewhat ruthless search for so-called organisational efficiency, through radical
downsizing exercises in the NSWpublic sector, generally, soon after Greiner took office,
also detracted from a positive ER environment. Within the context of economic
rationalism, downsizing was seen as a positive productivity initiative where units of
labour, (rather than employees as people), were simply being reduced on the basis of
efficiency. This technical-rational approach works against positive ER initiatives as a
public sector environment of fear and distrust is established. The absence of humanistic
values in ER considerations was not confined to the Greiner government, by any means,
but was similar to harsh economic rationalist responses in other jurisdictions (Laffin,1995;
Laffin and Painter, 1995).
This early productivity initiative, consistent with the marketisation of the NSW public
sector, of radical downsizing policy, heralded the end of security of tenure and other ER
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privileges that had been supported in the previous Labor era as an essential part of public
sector employment life. In an environment where just about everything from policy advice
and service provision became contestable and competitive, the SESwas also established in
a way that set it apart from the rest of the public service in NSW (Laffin, 1995;Laffin, and
Painter, 1995).
The NSW SESwas established, in October 1989,and was in accordance with a market-
based approach to ER. Created as a separate executive system, included was a formal
prohibition to trade union membership for SESofficers. In practice the SESwas meant to
attract key managers from the private sector, who were considered by government,
initially, to be more competent than their public sector counterparts. The SES/ERsystem
broadly was consistent with agency theory with defined principal-agent relationships
between Ministers and their Chief Executive Officers (CEOs),CEOs and SESOfficers, and
so on down the organisation, and reflected in performance agreements (UTS/Audit Office
of NSW, 1998).
To this end, a primary feature of the NSW SESwas the adoption of fixed term contract
employment arrangements (up to five years and renegotiable) and formal performance
management processes, with at least annual review. In setting up the SES, decisions
relating to appointments, retirements, terminations, removals from office,disciplinary, and
remuneration conditions and decisions were no longer subject to industrial relations
legislation, which applied more widely to the NSW public service. Thus, employee
protection was extremely limited as amember of the SES(UTS/Audit OfficeofNSW, 1998).
For a cost, however, officers moving from the NSW public service into the SES,initially,
could include a right of return to the public service in their first employment contracts, a
condition that was soon overturned. Salary maintenance, if the contract was terminated
for other than poor performance or more serious misdemeanour, was also offered to SES
members. Compensation orders could be made by a Statutory and Other Officers
Remuneration Tribunal (SOORT) as an independent body responsible for SESmarket
based salary and remuneration decisions. However, SOORT had no responsibility for
employing SESofficers and the intention of the SESwas clear. It was set up in a way that
would allow government to employ and ministerial whim and personal preferences to
compete with merit principles (UTS/Audit Office of NSW, 1998).
While it could be argued that there was always an inherent possibility for this to occur
under previous public sector ERarrangements, contract employment conditions made this
much more likely. (As later evidence indicates, the termination of SEScontracts for other
than poor performance, subsequently, has become institutionalised as a negative ER
practice). Nevertheless, attractive employment contracts with flexiblesalary and incentive
packages were supposed to compensate for such uncertainty of tenure. While the potential
employee benefits of the SEShave gradually been eroded from the early over-generous
options there has also been a trickle down effect in terms of principal-agent relationships
from CEOs to other staff that allows personal decisions, rather than merit, to impact
significantly upon staffing and promotional decisions (UTS/Audit Office of NSW, 1998).
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Some of these ER vulnerabilities were recognised as part of a formal review a year or so
after the SES commenced (Coopers and Lybrand, 1989; 1991). As a former Head of the
NSW Premier's Department (Halligan and Power, 1991) indicated, there were expressed
ER concerns about the SESincluding: too many officers in the SES;salaries in the SEShad
increased significantly even though many SESofficers were still doing the same job; the
private sector labour market model for assessing job worth was unrealistic; and, more pay
did not necessarily equate to enhanced performance and efficiency. A minister criticised
across the board pay awards by SOORT for the SES,which were claimed to be unrelated to
performance.
As the UTS/Audit Office of NSW research (1998) into the SES reveals, there was an
increasing divide between members of the SESand the rest of the public service in NSW.
Public service officers in the SESfeeder group, for example, could not understand how SES
staff doing little more than they were doing themselves in the work setting could be
rewarded so well, comparatively. There were also strong perceptions by members of the
feeder group that many SES staff were not as competent as members of the feeder group.
Some SESofficers, also, had become caught up in what was an increasing need to manage
up because of the obvious politicisation of the SES and high levels of insecurity about
tenure among SES staff. This left many feeder group and other public service staff
believing that they lacked appropriate guidance and leadership. The operation of the NSW
SESwas regarded, by some, as having negatively increased the division in salary levels and
skills between the SES and the SES feeder group. However, it was not just at the feeder
group level that there was dissatisfaction with the SES in ways that undermined positive
ER.
Halligan and Power (1991:144)report that an early review of the SESreinforced 'mounting
criticism' from Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) who were concerned about ministerial
intervention in organisational management. Even though this was consistent with the
corporate model that Greiner had established, what was at issue was whether ministers
were competent to act in the managerial role, determining what was an appropriate
forward plan for organisational performance. Furthermore, some ministers did not want
to formalise the performance arrangements from a managerial perspective, preferring to
operate informally and to address political issues as they developed. Ministers indicated
their preference for less formal processes such as informal meetings, briefings, and
continuing contact with CEOs (also Laffin, 1995).
As Laffin (1995) observes, the existence of the SES increased the opportunities for
ministerial intervention. Ministerial intervention increased the likelihood that good ER
practice within a defined formal system would also be compromised. As Laffin (1995:82)
contends, '[t]he SEShas meant that life in the senior reaches of the bureaucracy has become
more precarious'. In the first years of the SES, '330 SES officers were shifted out of the
service' Previously, security of tenure seemed to be equated with the capacity to provide
independent policy advice to a minister. However, with the introduction of contract
arrangements within the NSW SES, the willingness to provide such advice diminished in
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favour of more partisan ER. The capacity for ministers, effectively, to appoint their own
CEOs also undermined any concept of the merit principle within the defined criteria for
SES appointments.
Furthermore, in relation to inner budget sector organisations, the idea of merit based on
managerial experience in the private sector did not work in practice and it was apparent
that a lack of political experience and acumen led to failures with such appointments.
Therefore, contrary to SESrequirements it was obvious that generic management skills and
a commitment to organisational efficiency could not act as the main basis for merit, even
though they were the specified, essential criteria. Thus, merit in the context of the SESand
ER potentially became a highly subjective concept where manipulation of promotional
opportunities and selection processes could be impacted in all kinds of ways, not least of
all by informal, internal political networks. This is an issue related to ER that continued
into the present Labor government's time in office from 1995 (Laffin, 1995).
The SES Politicisation 'Model' of ERReform?
The VTS/Audit Office of NSW research (1998), further, confirms that there were (and are)
systemic vulnerabilities within the SES that can impact upon positive ER processes and
outcomes in the NSW public sector. The present Labor government, while probably
concerned about equity and efficiency, also has allowed the potential for politicisation of
the SESto become entrenched in practice. Ministers have persisted, to a reasonable extent,
in supporting informal processes of executive management and ER. Without genuine
ministerial commitment, the capacity of the formal SESsystem to moderate behaviours of
the key actors, in some areas of the NSW public sector, within the context of a well-defined
and positive ER approach, has been under considerable threat. Executive performance
management issues basically have been determined on informal, personalised and
individual assessments rather than efficiency, even though efficiency has been the catch
cry.
This situation has brought negative attention to the worth of the SES, in the media, in
parliament and through processes of independent review (Horin, 1997; Morris and
Humphries, 1997; Morris, 1998). On occasions, decisions by ministers to dispense with
CEOs, or CEOs' decision to remove SESofficers, apparently, have been personally, rather
than performance, based. Evidence from the Independent Commission Against
Corruption (ICAC) from an enquiry relating to the SES(under the present government in
NSW), strongly suggests that informal, power political decisions have overwhelmed the
formal legal, ethical and systemic SES decision-making parameters (VTS/Audit Office of
NSW 1998). The SESand other officers involved apparently saw their informal behaviour
as more appropriate than formally prescribed due process because of ministerial demands
and a sense of loyalty to the government of the day. This seriously undermines the
potential for positive ER and permeates to the lower reaches of the public service, way
beyond the ranks of the SES.
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Recommendations resulting from a highly publicised SES incident surrounding the
removal from office of a CEO were made by the ICAC (UTS/Audit Office of NSW, 1998)
with the intention of enhancing the performance of the NSW SES. While the ICAC
recommendations had rational merit, systemically, they did not reflect the reality of the
political environment and informal practices related to the SES. Nason (1996) also reports
that the government was unwilling to support the ICAC (1996) recommendations, which
interfered with ministerial powers to determine SES appointments and position levels.
Thus, equity is no longer a driving value of merit as a fundamental aspect of ER in the
public sector (UTS/Audit Office of NSW, 1998).
Furthermore, these public displays relating to the politicisation of the SESdo not reinforce
the systemic integrity of the formal SES or the reputations of key actors. Such
investigations also indicate that political authority will be the likely main determinant of
much SES decision-making. Therefore, a rational systems' approach to ER and other
reform may not be supported by the government of the day for political reasons. How this
conflict in performance standards might be addressed is obviously important. To some
extent, it will depend upon the will of government to support the professionalism of the
SES. How ER as well as the public interest might actually be served positively through the
SES is still to be properly defined, even to the present. Whether ethical and professional
standards and considerations can be strengthened through formal codes of conduct, as
outlined by reviewing agencies including the ICAC, the Ombudsman or the Auditor-
General, is questionable (UTS/Audit Office of NSW 1998).
While conceptually, the formal NSW SESmodel shares much in common with formal SESs
in other key polities (OECD 1997a; 1997b), evidence confirms that the NSW SES
encompasses ER aspects of a more politicised Washington style SESmodel. However, as
the OECD (1997a; 1997b) indicates in a selective survey of some national governments'
senior public services, including discrete SESs, fixed term contracts (that can be
manipulated by government) are not unusual (eight out of thirteen countries). It is also
noted that governments in most countries (fifteen out of seventeen), like NSW, have
discretionary powers to terminate, or recommend the termination of SES members or
senior public servants for reasons other than poor performance, including loss of trust and
confidence, and organisational restructuring. The degree of senior executive turnover for
political reasons when the government changes varies from polity to polity with the United
States of America, France and Sweden having the highest numbers (OECD, 1997a; 1997b).
Therefore, an overall finding from the UTS (/Audit Office of NSW, 1998)research was that
the formal NSW SES system, overall, was unable to operate as intended, on a rational
management test. The interpenetration of politics into executive decision-making
processes means a continuing politicisation of the formal systems and a further watering
down of the merit principle and good ERpractice. Effectively, the point at which optimal
performance can occur along the executive performance spectrum from informal-political
to formal-SES system is driven differently depending upon the major actors of the time.
While it is not suggested that the SESwill always be political and that the merit principle
will always be compromised, the potential for compromise is always there.
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Such a potential dissonance between points of optimal performance in a formal and
informal sense occurs because the respective actors (ministers, CEOs) have different
priorities and interests, and probably different value sets and ethical standards.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that fundamental differences between the critical actor groups
who prefer to manage ER formally or informally can be reconciled to create a common
point of optimal executive performance (UTS/Audit Office of NSW, 1998).
In reality, these two streams of influence (political and the rational) operate as part of the
model of the NSW SES,one of which potentially promotes good ER practice and one of
which does not. While the rational NSW SESsystem is supported by written guidelines
and advice a sometimes, dominant, flexible,political stream operates. This political stream
is characterised by informality, personal relationships and reward, power behaviours,
political patronage and ad hoc decision making processes which are often aligned and
responsive to political imperatives and key electoral issues, rather than concerns about
good ER, as such (UTS/Audit Office of NSW, 1998).
This situation is not surprising. As Clegg (1989: 216) contends, in a comprehensive
theoretical and critical examination of issues related to power, neo classical economic
theory, which conceptually presupposes that there can be a perfect market and exchange
model for the public sector, is simply unrealistic. 'Adherence to a reality principle requires
the abandonment of these limiting assumptions ... Consideration of power requires
consideration of imperfect exchanges under imperfect market conditions.' Such an
imperfect system of informal exchange obviously operates within the NSW SESto retard
good ERpolicy and practice, even though efficiency is a supposedly driving force.
Clegg's (1989)ideas on power strongly support a view that within public sectors as part of
ER practice, rewards for certain actions and behaviours of agents, required by the
principals, can be achieved through both formal and informal power structures. Therefore,
parallel systems of exchange, reward and relationships operate as a matter of course.
While the formal system may promote a constancy of action and process, the informal
system can support implicitly institutionalised power relationships and the defining of
channels which facilitate the potential less frequent incidences of power exchanges. A
process that inevitably undermines some of the gains achieved in ER in the first Labor
government's (1976-1988)political environment.
Equity, Efficiency and Politicisation in ER?
The three present and recent past governments in NSW have each supported a different
dominant driving force for ER reform whether explicitly determined, or not. The first
Labor government while also concerned about issues of efficiency, through the Wilenski
(1986;Alaba, 1994) reforms chose a strong ERmodel based on social justice and equity.
The second Liberal-National Party Coalition government shifted from an equity model of
ER to a reform approach based strongly on efficiency. The third, present, Labor
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Government in spite of any more rational managerialist rhetoric to the contrary, at times,
has run an ER agenda based largely on politicisation of the more senior ranks of the NSW
public sector. In this sense, Greiner's development of a SEShas allowed for a much more
politicised public sector leadership group to develop in a way that to this day continues to
undermine basic principles of ER such as equity and merit (Laffin, 1995;UTS/Audit Office
of NSW, 1998).
While the UTS (/Audit Office of NSW, 1998)research did not directly attempt to determine
which is the preferable driving force for ER practice, it is apparent that Wilenski's (1986)
social reform model, in intent, is a far more employee sensitive approach. The efficiency
(economic rationalist) model can too easily dehumanise the public sector environment in a
way that inevitably undermines the potential for people centred ER. However, a
politicised public sector environment where merit and equity are likely to be overwhelmed
by political patronage and croneyism is probably even worse as a driving force, as ER
practice in this context can only lead to considerable uncertainty for all employee groups,
whether in the SES or not.
Having identified the three different driving forces the question that remains from this
analysis is not so much whether ERmodels based on equity, efficiency and/or politicisation
represent the strong and the weak but whether equity and efficiency can be reconciled into
a more balanced paradigm of exemplary public sector ER,where the political environment
has limited impact on ERmerit based practice. While an equity model offers much from an
ERperspective the current dominance of the market-based approach and some rejection of
social democratic ideology in its generous form, by most governments, means that
efficiency will remain an important consideration at least in the foreseeable future.
However, if efficiency models that impact seriously and negatively on good ER policies
and practice directly or indirectly allow greater politicisation, then the exemplary capacity
of governments and public sectors in this ER field will continue to diminish significantly
(UTS/Audit Office of NSW, 1998).
The fundamental issue surrounding ER and merit is really a political one. Whether the
government of the day is prepared to acknowledge that the formal performance of the SES
and ER is important to the outcomes of public sector management. If not, some greater
transparency is required. In particular, the situation for ER is untenable in terms of
uncertain contracts based on ministerial whim rather than defined good performance in a
more formal way. The basic challenge in addressing the critical issues is to determine to
what extent rational systemic reform can support rather than hinder ERpractice, given that
the NSW SES operates in a highly contestable, dynamic and political environment from
which the SEScannot realistically be divorced, or protected, entirely (UTS/Audit Office of
NSW, 1998).
Conclusion
This article has examined ERpractices in the NSW public sector over nearly thirty years to
the present and has identified the strong driving forces of ER reform during that time. It is
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evident that three different driving forces, whether deliberately chosen or not, have been
supported by governments during that time. While the social justice and equity based
approach to ER represents the first and most significant reform, there is evidence, which
suggests that ER practices by governments are less exemplary now than they were nearly
thirty years ago. However, social justice as a prime concern for government both within
their public sectors and without has long been overwhelmed by more economic and
political concerns about public sector ER. To a large extent, the capacity for exemplary ER
reform in the public sector has been lost in favour of less humanistic and economic
rationalist approaches. The SES rather than representing a leadership model of exemplary
ER has provided the opportunity for much more personalised and political decision
making in an ER sense. Given the presenting evidence over the last decade or so it is
unlikely that the government will be reinstated to its exemplary ER state unless it chooses
to be far more responsible in an ER sense.
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